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THE INVISIBLE DISCOURSE
OF THE LAW: REFLECTIONS
ON LEGAL LITERACY
AND GENERAL EDUCATION
James Boyd White
Almost everyone who is not trained in the law has struggled to under
stand legal documents, such as contracts and guarantees - not because they
read poorly but because they lack legal knowledge and experience with
legal language. Readers can experience the same difficulty in other fields
such as philosophy, literary theory, or economics; it takes time to gain the
knowledge required to become an expert reader in these areas. However,
between the extremes of the trained legal expert and the complete novice
is "another possible meaning of legal literacy: the degree of competence in
legal discourse that is required for meaningful and active life in our increas
ingly legalistic and litigious culture" (par. 2). It is this degree of compe
tence that the author discusses in the following essay.
James Boyd White is a professor of law at the University of Chicago.
His interests and knowledge extend beyond the law to the history of civi
lization; he is a member of a faculty group that focuses on the ancient
Mediterranean World. He is the author of The Legal Imagination and coau
thor of Constitutional Criminal Procedure.
As you read, try to answer the following question in relation to the
essay: What general principles about language can I learn from the essay?

The subject of this essay is legal literacy, but to put it that way
requires immediate clarification for that phrase has a wide range of pos
sible meanings. At one end of its spectrum of significance, for example,
legal literacy means full competence in legal discourse, both as reader
and as writer. This kind of literacy is the object of a professional educa
tion, and it requires not only a period of formal schooling but years of
practice as well. Indeed, as with other real languages, the ideal of perfect
competence in legal language can never be attained: practitioners are
always learning about their language and about the world, they are in a
sense always remaking both, and these processes never come to an end.
What this sort of professional literacy entails and how it is to be talked
about are matters of interest to lawyers and law teachers, but this mean
ing of legal literacy will not be discussed here. At the other end of the
spectrum of legal literacy are people who recognize legal words and
locutions as foreign to themselves, as part of the world of law. A person
who is literate in this sense knows that there is a world of language and
action called "law," but little more about it: certainly not enough to have
any real access to it.
Between these extremes is another possible meaning of legal liter
acy: the degree of competence in legal discourse that is required for
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meaningful and active life in our increasingly legalistic and litigious cul
ture. Citizens who are ideally literate in this sense are not expected to
know how to draft deeds and wills or to try cases or to manage the
bureaucratic maze, but they do know when and how to call upon the
specialists who can do these things. More important, they are able to
protect and advance their own interests: for example in dealing with a
landlord or a tenant or in their interactions with the police, with the
zoning commission, or with the Social Security Administration. People
with this type of literacy are able not only to follow but to evaluate news
reports and periodical literature dealing with legal matters - from Su
preme Court decisions to House Committee reports. They know how to
function effectively in positions of responsibility and leadership (say as
an elected member of a school board or as chair of a neighborhood
association or as a member of a zoning board or police commission).
This sense of the term legal literacy embodies the ideal of a fully com
petent and engaged citizen, and that ideal is a wholly proper one to keep
before us.
But this ideal is for our purposes far too inclusive, for however one
defines "legal literacy," one who possesses such literacy also has a great
deal in addition: a complete set of social, intellectual, and political rela
tions and capacities. But perhaps we can meaningfully ask, What is the
legal literacy that such an ideal figure would have? How could this sort
of competence be taught? What seem to be the natural barriers to its
acquisition? In the first part of this paper I deal with these questions, but
in reverse order. I begin by identifying those features of legal discourse
that make it peculiarly difficult for the nonlawyer to understand and use.
I then suggest some ways in which those features might be made com
prehensible and manageable, and how their value and function might be
appreciated. This discussion in turn will constitute my answer to the
first question, that is, what kind of legal literacy should an ordinary
citizen have, and how can it contribute not only to the development of
social competence but to a true education of the mind and self?
THE INVISIBLE DISCOURSE OF THE LAW
It is a common experience for a nonlawyer to feel that legal lan
guage is in a deep sense foreign: not only are its terms incomprehensible,
but its speakers seem to have available to them a repertoire of moves
denied to others. Nonlawyers neither understand the force of legal argu
ments nor know how to answer them. But the language is, if possible,
worse than merely foreign. It is an unpredictable, exasperating, and
shifting mixture of the foreign and the familiar. Much of what lawyers
say and write is, after all, intelligible to the nonlawyer, and one can
sometimes speak in legally competent ways. But at any moment things
can change without notice: the language slides into the incomprehensi-
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ble, and the nonlawyer has no idea how or why the shift occurred. This
is powerfully frustrating, to say the least.
But legal illiteracy is more than frustrating, for it entails an increasingly important disability, almost a disenfranchisement. At one time in
our history a citizen did not need to have any specialized knowledge of
law, for our law was a common law that reflected the customs and
expectations of the people to such a degree that ordinary social compe
tence was normally enough for effectiveness in the enterprises of life. No
special legal training was required. But in our increasingly bureaucratic
and legalistic world, this assumption seems less and less realistic. Frus
trated citizens are likely to feel that their lives are governed by language
that they cannot understand- in leases, in form contracts, or in federal
and state regulations. Who, for example, can read and understand an
insurance contract or a pension plan? An OSHA or IRS regulation? Yet
these documents govern our lives and are even said in some sense to have
the standing of our own acts, either directly, as in the contracts we sign,
or indirectly, as in the laws promulgated by officials who represent us.
In a democracy this unintelligibility is doubly intolerable, for the people
are supposed to be competent both as voters who elect the lawmakers
and as jurors who apply the laws. They cannot do these things if they
cannot understand the law.
What can explain this flickering pattern of intelligibility and unin
telligibility, the stroboscopic alternation of the familiar with the strange?
The most visible and frequently denounced culprits are the arcane vocab
ulary of the law and the complicated structure of its sentences and para
graphs. Thus, people ask why lawyers cannot be made to speak in words
they recognize and in sentences they can understand. If lawyers would
do so, the ordinary citizen could become competent as a reader of law
and even as a legal speaker. Our political method of democracy and its
moral premise of equality demand no less. It may be indeed that the only
actual effect of this obfuscating legal jargon is to maintain the mystique
of the legal profession, and if that mystique is destroyed so much the
better.
Impulses such as these have given rise to what is known as the plain
English movement, which aims at a translation of legal language into
comprehensible English. This movement has had practical effects. At the
federal level, for example, one of President Carter's first actions was to
order that all regulations be cast in language intelligible to the ordinary
citizen, and New York and other states have passed laws requiring that
state regulations and certain form contracts meet a similar standard.
If such directives were seriously regarded, they might indeed re
duce needless verbosity and obscurity and streamline unwieldy legal
sentences. But even if they succeeded in these desirable goals, they would
not solve the general problem they address, for, as I try to show, the
most serious obstacles to comprehensibility are not the vocabulary and
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sentence structure employed in the law but the unstated conventions by
which the language operates -what I call the "invisible discourse" of the
law. Behind the words, that is, are expectations about the ways in which
they will be used, expectations that do not find explicit expression any
where but are part of the legal culture that the surface language simply
assumes. These expectations are constantly at work, directing argument,
shaping responses, determining the next move, and so on; their effects
are everywhere but they themselves are invisible. These conventions, not
the diction, primarily determine the mysterious character of legal speech
and literature: not the "vocabulary" of the law but what might be called
its "cultural syntax."
In what follows I identify those features of the cultural syntax of
legal language that seem most radically to differentiate it from ordinary
speech. I then outline some methods by which I think students can be
taught to become at least somewhat literate in a language that works in
these ways. Finally I suggest that this kind of literacy not only entails an
important increase in social competence but itself contributes to the de
velopment of mind and attitude that is the proper object of a general
education.
The Language of Rules
Many of the special difficulties of legal language derive from the
fact that at the center of most legal conversations there is a form we call
"the legal rule." Not so general as to be a mere maxim or platitude
(though we have those in law, too) or so specific as to be a mere order or
command (though there are legal versions of these), the legal rule is a
directive of intermediate generality. It establishes relations among classes
of objects, persons, and events: "All A are [or: shall be] B"; or, "If A,
then B." Examples would include the following:
(1) Burglary consists of breaking and entering a dwelling house in
the nighttime with intent to commit a felony therein. A person
convicted of burglary shall be punished by imprisonment not
to exceed 5 years.
(2) Unless otherwise ordered by the court or agreed by the parties,
a former husband's obligation to pay alimony terminates upon
the remarriage of his former wife.
Legal conversations about rules such as these have three major char
acteristics that tend to mystify and confuse nonlawyers.
The Invisible Shift from a Language of Description
to a Language of Judgment
The form of the legal rule misleads ordinary readers into expecting
that once it is understood, its applications will be very simple. The rules
presented above, for example, have a plain and authoritative air and seem
to contemplate no difficulty whatever in their application. (Notice that
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with the possible exception of the word "felony," there is nothing legal
istic in their diction.) One will simply look to the facts and determine
whether or not the specified conditions exist; if so, the consequence
declared by the rule will follow; if not, it will not. "Did she remarry?
Then the alimony stops." Nothing to it, the rule seems to say: just look
at the world and do what we tell you. It calls for nothing more than a
glance to check the name against the reality and obedience to a plain
directive.
In practice, of course, the rule does not work so simply-or not
always. Is it "breaking and entering" if the person pushes open a screen
door but has not yet entered the premises? Is a garage with a loft used as
an apartment a "dwelling house"? Is dusk "nighttime"? Is a remarriage
that is later annulled a "remarriage" for the purpose of terminating prior
alimony? What if there is no formal remarriage but the ex-wife has a
live-in boyfriend? These questions do not answer themselves but require
thought and conversation of a complex kind, of which no hint is ex
pressed in the rule itself
Of course there will be some cases so clear that no one could rea
sonably argue about the meaning of the words, and in these cases the
rule will work in a fairly simple and direct fashion. Most of our experi
ence with rules, in fact, works this way: we can find out what to do to
get a passport or a driver's license, we know what the rules of the road
require, we can figure out when we need a building permit, and so on.
But these are occasions of rule obedience for which no special social or
intellectual competence is involved.
One way to identify what is misleading about the form of a legal
rule might be to say that it appears to be a language of description,
which works by a simple process of comparison, but in cases of any
difficulty it is actually a language of judgment, which works in ways
that find no expression in the rule itself In such cases the meaning of its
terms is not obvious, as the rule seems to assume, but must be deter
mined by a process of interpretation and judgment to which the rule
gives no guidance whatever. The discourse by which it works is in this
sense invisible.

The False Appearance of Deductive Rationality

If one does recognize that there may be difficulties in understanding
and applying a rule, one may still be misled by its form into thinking
that the kind of reasoning it requires (and makes possible) is deductive in
character. A legal rule looks rather like a rule of geometry, and we
naturally expect it to work like one. For example, when the meaning of
a term in a rule is unclear-say "dwelling house" or "nighttime" in the
burglary statute-we expect to find a stipulative definition elsewhere
(perhaps in a special section of the statute) that will define it for us, just
as Euclid tells us the meaning of his essential terms. Or if there is no
explicit definition, we expect there to be some other rule, general in
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form, that when considered in connection with our rule will tell us what
it must mean. But it is often in vain that we look for such definitions and
rules, and when we do find them they often prove to be of little help.
Suppose, for example, the question is whether a person who is
caught breaking into a garage that has a small apartment in the loft can
be convicted of burglary: does a statutory definition of"dwelling house"
as"any residential premises" solve the problem? Or suppose one finds in
the law dealing with mortgages a definition of "dwelling house" that
plainly does (or does not) cover the garage with the loft: does that help?
Upon reflection about the purpose of the burglary statute, which is to
punish a certain kind of wrongdoing, perhaps "dwelling house" will
suddenly be seen to have a subjective or moral dimension, and properly
mean "place where the actor knows that people are living" or, if that be
thought too lenient, "place where he has reason to believe that people are
living."
Or consider the annulment example. Suppose one finds a statutory
statement that"an annulled marriage is a nullity at law." Does that mean
that the alimony payment revives upon the annulment of the wife's sec
ond marriage? Even if the annulment takes place fifteen years after the
date of that marriage? Or suppose that there is another statute, providing
that "alimony may be awarded in an annulment proceeding to the same
extent as in a divorce proceeding"? This would mean that the wife could
get alimony from her second husband, and if the question is seen in
terms of fairness among the parties, this opportunity would be highly
relevant to whether or not her earlier right to alimony has expired.
The typical form of the legal rule thus seems to invite us to think
that the important intellectual operations involved in our use of it will be
those of deduction and entailment, as in geometry: that our main concern
will be with the relations among propositions, as one rule is related to
others by the logical rules of noncontradiction and the like, and that the
end result of every intellectual operation will be determined by the rules
of deduction.
In fact the situation could hardly be more different. Instead of each
term in a legal rule having a meaning of the sort necessary for deductive
operations to go on in the first place, each term has a range of possible
meanings, among which choices will have to be made. There is no one
right answer to the question whether this structure is a "dwelling house"
or that relationship a "remarriage"; there are several linguistically and
logically tolerable possibilities, and the intellectual process of law is one
of arguing and reasoning about which of them is to be preferred. Of
course the desirability of internal consist�ncy is a factor (though we shall
soon see that the law tolerates a remarkable degree of internal contradic
tion), and of course in some cases some issues will be too plain for
argument. But the operations that lawyers and judges engage in with
respect to legal rules are very different from what we might expect from
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the form of the rule itself They derive their substance and their shape
from the whole world of legal culture and draw upon the most diverse
materials, ranging from general maxims to particular cases and regula
tions. The discourse of the law is far less technical, far more purposive
and sensible, than the nonlawyer is likely to think. Argument about the
meaning of words in the burglary statute, for example, would include
argument about the reasons for having such a statute, about the kind of
harm it is meant to prevent or redress, and about the degree and kind of
blame-worthiness it should therefore require. Legal discourse is contin
uous at some points with moral or philosophic discourse, at others with
history or anthropology or sociology; and in its tension between the
particular and the general, in its essentially metaphorical character, it has
much in common with poetry itself The substantive constitution of
legal discourse is of course too complex a subject for us at present; what
is important now is to see that this discourse is invisible to the ordinary
reader of the legal rules.
These characteristics of legal language convert what looks like a
discourse connected with the world by the easy process of naming, and
rendered internally coherent by the process of deduction, into a much
more complex linguistic and cultural system. The legal rule seems to
foreclose certain questions of fact and value, and of course in the clear
cases it does so. But in the uncertain cases, which are those that cause
trouble, it can better be said to open than to close a set of questions: it
gives them definition, connection with other questions, and a place in a
rhetorical universe, thus permitting their elaboration and resolution in a
far more rich and complex way than could otherwise be the case. Except
in the plainest cases, the function of the ordinary meanings of terms used
in legal rules is not to determine a necessary result but to establish the
uncertain boundaries of permissible decision: the function of logic is not
to require a particular result by deductive force but to limit the range of
possibilities by prohibiting (or making difficult) contradictory uses of
the same terms in the same sentences.
But you have perhaps noticed an odd evasion in that last sentence
and may be wondering: Does not the law absolutely prohibit inconsistent
uses of the same terms in the same rules? Indeed it does not, or not
always, and this is the last of the three mystifying features of legal
discourse about which I wish to speak.
The Systematic Character of Legal Discourse
and the Dilemma of Consistency
I have thus far suggested that while the legal rule appears to operate
by a simple process of looking at the world to see whether a named
object can be found (the "dwelling house" or the "remarriage"), this
appearance is highly misleading, for in fact the world does not often
present events in packages that are plainly within the meaning of a legal
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label (or plainly outside of it). Behind the application of the label is a
complex world of reasoning, which is in fact the real life of the law but
to which the rule makes no overt allusion and for which it gives no
guidance. To the extent that the form of the rule suggests that the con
trolling mode of reason will be deductive, it gives rise to expectations
that are seriously misleading. The real discourse of the law is invisible.
This feature of the law may seem bad enough, but in practice things
are even worse, and for two reasons. First, however sophisticated and
complex one's reasoning may in fact be, at the end of the process the
legal speaker is required after all to express his or her judgment in the
most simple binary terms: either the label in the rule fits or it does not.
No third possibility is admitted. All the richness and complexity of legal
life seem to be denied by the kind of act in which the law requires it to
be expressed. For example, while we do not know precisely how the
"dwelling house" or "remarriage" questions would in fact be argued
out, we can see that the process would be complex and challenging, with
room both for uncertainty and for invention. But at the end of the
process the judge or jury will have to make a choice between two alter
natives and express it by the application (or nonapplication) of the label
in question: this is or is not a "dwelling house." In this way the legal
actors are required to act as if the legal world really were as simple as the
rule misleadingly pretends it is. Everything is reduced to a binary choice
after all.
Second, it seems that the force of this extreme reductionism cannot
be evaded by giving the terms of legal rules slightly different meanings
in different contexts, for the rudiments of logic and fairness alike require
that the term be given the same meaning each time it is used, or the
system collapses into incoherence and injustice. The most basic rule of
logic (the rule of noncontradiction) and the most basic rule of justice (like
results in like cases) both require consistency of meaning.
A familiar example demonstrating the requirement of internal con
sistency in systematic talk about the world is this: "However you define
'raining' the term must be used for the purposes of your system such
that it is always true that it either is or is not "raining.'" Any other
principle would lead to internal incoherence and would destroy the reg
ularity of the discourse as a way of talking about the world. To put the
principle in terms of the legal example we have been using: however one
defines "dwelling house" for purposes of the burglary statute, it must be
used in such a manner that everything in the world either is or is not a
"dwelling house"; and because the law is a system for organizing expe
rience coherently across time and space, it must be given the same mean
ing every time it is used. Logic and fairness alike require no less.
The trouble is that these principles of discourse are very different
from those employed in ordinary conversations. Who in real life would
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ever take the view that it must be the case that it either is or is not
"raining"? Suppose it is just foggy and wet? If someone in ordinary life
asked you whether it was raining out, you would not expect that person
to insist upon an answer cast in categorical terms, let alone in categorical
terms that were consistent over a set of conversations. The answer to the
question would depend upon the reason it was asked: Does your ques
tioner want to know whether to wear a raincoat? W hether to water the
garden? to call off a picnic? to take a sunbath? In each case the answer
will be different, and the speaker will in no case feel required to limit the
response to an affirmation or negation of the condition "raining." One
will speak to the situation as a whole, employing all of one's resources.
And one will not worry much about how the word "raining" has been
used in other conversations, on other occasions, for the convention of
ordinary speech is that critical terms are defined anew each time for the
purposes of a particular conversation, not as part of a larger system.
W hat is distinctive about conversations concerning the meaning of
rules is their systematic character. Terms are defined not for the purposes
of a particular conversation but for a class of conversations, and the
principle of consistency applies across the class. And this class of conver
sations has, as we have just seen, a peculiar form: in the operation of the
rule, all experience is reduced to a single set of questions - say, whether
the elements of burglary exist in this case - each of which must be an
swered "yes" or "no." We are denied what would be the most common
response in our ordinary life, which would be to say that the label fits in
this way and not in that or that it depends on why you ask. The complex
process of argument and judgment that is involved in understanding a
legal rule and relating it to the facts of a particular case is at the end
forced into a simple statement of application or nonapplication of a label,
under a requirement of noncontradiction over time.
But there is still another layer to the difficulty. We may talk about
the requirement of consistency as a matter of logic or justice, but how is
it to be achieved? Can we for example ensure that "dwelling house" will
be used exactly the same way in every burglary case? Obviously we
cannot, for a number of reasons. First, different triers of fact will resolve
conflicts of testimony in different ways - one judge or jury would believe
one side, a second the other - and this builds inconsistency into the pro
cess at the most basic level, that of descriptive fact. Second, while the
judge may be required to give the same instruction to the jury in every
case, the statement of that instruction will to some extent be cast in
general terms and admit a fair variation of interpretation even where the
historical facts are settled (e.g., a judicial definition of "dwelling house"
as "premises employed as a regular residence by those entitled to posses
sion thereof"). Third, if the instruction includes, as well it might, a
subjective element (saying for example that the important question is
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whether the defendant knew he was breaking into a place where people
were living), there will be an even larger variation in application of what
is on the surface the same language.
In short, the very generality of legal language, which constitutes
for us an important part of its character as rational and as fair, means that
some real variation in application must be tolerated. As the language
becomes more general, the delegation of authority to the applier of the
language, and hence the toleration of inconsistency in result, becomes
greater. As the language becomes more specific, this delegation is re
duced, and with it the potential inconsistency. But increasing specificity
has its costs, and they too can be stated in terms of consistency. Consider
a sentencing statute, for example, that authorizes the punishment of
burglars by sentences ranging from probation to five years in prison.
This delegation of sentencing authority (usually to a judge) seems to be
a toleration of wide variation in result. But it all depends upon how the
variation is measured. For to insist that all burglars receive the same
sentence, say, three years in jail, is to treat the hardened repeater and the
inexperienced novice as if they were identical. That treatment is "consis
tent" on one measure (burglars are treated alike) but "inconsistent" on
another (an obvious difference among offenders is not recognized).
For our purposes the point is this: the requirements (1) that terms
be defined not for a single conversation but for the class of conversation
established by the rule in question and (2) that the meaning given words
be consistent through the system are seriously undercut in practice by a
wide toleration of inconsistency in result and in meaning. I do not mean
to suggest, however, that either the requirement of consistency or its
qualifications are inappropriate -quite the reverse. It seems to me that
we have here identified a dilemma central to the life of any discourse
that purports to be systematic, rational, and just. My purpose has simply
been to describe a structural tension in legal discourse that differentiates
it sharply from most ordinary speech.
In addition to the foregoing I wish to mention one other quality of
legal discourse that radically distinguishes it from ordinary language: its
procedural character.
Procedural Character of Legal Speech
In working with a rule., one must not only articulate substantive
questions of definition-is "dusk" "nighttime"? is a "bicycle" a "vehi
cle"? etc. -one must also ask a set of related procedural questions. Every
question of interpretation involves these related questions: Who shall
decide what this language means? under what conditions or circum
stances, and subject to what limits or controls? Why? And in what body
of discourse are these questions to be thought about, argued out, and
decided? The answers to such questions are rarely found in the rule itself
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Suppose, for example, the question is what the word "nighttime"
should mean in the burglary statute or, to begin not with a rule but with
a difficulty in ordinary life, whether the development of a shopping
center should be permitted on Brown's farm. It is the professional habit
of lawyers to think not only about the substantive merits of the question
and how they would argue it but also about (a) the person or agency
who ought to decide it and (b) the procedure by which it ought to be
decided. Is the shopping-center question a decision for the zoning com
mission, for the neighbors, for the city as a whole, for Brown, or for the
county court? Is the "nighttime" question one for the judge to decide,
for the jury, or-if you think what matters is the defendant's intent in
that respect-in part for the defendant? Every legal rule, however purely
substantive in form, is also by implication a procedural and institutional
statement as well, and the lawyers who read it will realize this and start
to argue about its meaning in this dimension too. The function of the
rule is thus to define not only substantive topics but also procedures of
argument and debate and questions about the definition and allocation of
competencies to act. The rule does so either expressly or by implication,
but in either event it calls upon discourse that is largely invisible to the
reader not legally trained.
To sum up my point, what characterizes legal discourse is that it is
in a double sense (both substantively and procedurally) constitutive in
nature: it creates a set of questions that define a world of thought and
action, a set of roles and voices by which experience will be ordered and
meanings established and shared, a set of occasions and methods for
public speech that constitute us as a community and as a polity. In all of
this, legal discourse has its own ways of working, which are to be found
not in the rules that are at its center of the structure but in the culture
that determines how these rules are to be read and talked about.
I have identified some of the special ways of thinking and talking
that characterize legal discourse. Far more than any technical vocabulary,
it is these conventions that are responsible for the foreignness of legal
speech. To put it slightly differently, there is a sense in which one creates
technical vocabulary whenever one creates a rule of the legal kind, for
the operation of the rule in a procedural system itself necessarily entails
an artificial way of giving meaning both to words and to events. These
characteristics of legal discourse mean that the success of any movement
to translate legal speech into plain English will be severely limited. For
if one replaces a legal word with an ordinary English word, the sense of
increased normalcy will be momentary at best: the legal culture will go
immediately to work, and the ordinary word will begin to lose its shape,
its resiliency, and its familiarity and become, despite the efforts of the
drafter, a legal word after all. The reason for this is that the word will
work as part of the legal language, and it is the way this language works
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that determines the meaning of its terms. T his is what I meant when I
said that it is not the vocabulary of the legal language that is responsible
for its obscurity and mysteriousness, but its cultural syntax, the invisible
expectations governing the way the words are to be used.

FOR DISCUSSION AND WRITING
1. Explain the "invisible discourse" of the law.
2. What is "the plain English movement" (par. 7)? Why would its objectives
have limited effect on legal literacy?
3. Explain the shift from a language of description to a language of
judgment.
4. In what ways does the following summary apply to the discourse of
other groups with which you are familiar (par. 35)? Reread the sum
mary, substituting for legal such terms as fraternity, sorority,Jamily, baseball,
and CB.
[W]hat characterizes legal discourse is that it is in a double sense
(both substantively and procedurally) constitutive in nature: it cre
ates a set of questions that define a world of thought and action, a
set of roles and voices by which experience will be ordered and
meanings established and shared, a set of occasions and methods
for public speech that constitute us as a community and as a polity.
In all of this, legal discourse has its own ways of working, which
are to be found not in the rules that are at its center of the structure
but in the culture that determines how these rules are to be read
and talked about.
5. Does the process of discerning the meaning of legal writing seem more
like discovering meaning (mining) or recovering meaning (detecting) to
you?
6. Technical terms such as felony, writ, and mandamus are very common. Do
you feel that when lawyers are writing for the general public, they should
substitute everyday language for such terminology? Explain.
7. White's notion of literacy is more involved and extensive than most
people's notions. How would White determine whether a person is com
pletely literate in legal discourse?
8. Does White present a convincing case for the need to increase legal
literacy? Explain.
9. Explain "the false appearance of deductive rationality" (pars. 16-22).
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